We estimate, from first-principles, the rate of inter-party avalanche involvements. The model suggests that the likelihood of inter-party involvements is quadratic in the density of partiestwice as many parties quadruples the likelihood. The model predicts that when the product of the party-density and the area of a day's potential avalanches approaches one, inter-party avalanche involvements will become a substantial fraction of all avalanche involvements. As a corollary, the relative rate of inter-party involvements is expected to increase with avalanche size. We argue, with selected North American inter-party incidents from 2001-2019, that inter-party involvements are a timely concern. To spur conversation, we enumerate a variety of strategies that may mitigate inter-party hazard.
I. INTRODUCTION
The number and density of backcountry travelers continues to increase [2] [3] [4] [5] in the United States and around the world. Many have written [6] [7] [8] [9] about the emerging hazard of inter-party involvements. At some density of backcountry travelers, avalanches triggered by one party will be likely to strike another. This work gives formal voice to this idea and, further, suggests that the time when such involvements become frequent is either now or in the near future. In Section II, we estimate the relevant critical density from first principles. In Section III, we enumerate several recent inter-party avalanche incidents in North America. In Section IV, we enumerate and discuss strategies that may partially mitigate the risk.
This work provides a framework within which to discuss and estimate the magnitude of the concern, addresses it directly as a hazard, and attempts to spur discussion of strategies to reduce the likelihood of future inter-party involvements.
II. ESTIMATION
To assess inter-party avalanche involvements as a concern, it is useful to develop a first-principles model for their likelihood. The estimation that follows is a simple approach that is likely to require small corrections to yield quantitative predictions. This model has qualitative predictive power, predicting both that the interparty involvement rate is quadratic in party density and that there is a critical party-density at which the interparty involvement rate becomes significant. * cah49@uw.edu
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Diagram showing the definitions of A, Astartzone,and A avalanche . Astartzone is the area of a day's typical individual start-zone. Nparties here is 7.
A. Derivation
Suppose that there are N parties parties of winter travelers in a region of area A, shown in Figure 1 , where N parties > 1. This analysis is independent of the definition of a "party", but for the estimates that follow, we define a party as "any group, as small as one person, that travels independently". Let n party = N parties /A be the party-density. Here, we define an avalanche "involvement" as an interaction between a party and an avalanche, an "incident" as an event in which at least one involvement occurs, and an "accident" as an incident that yielded significant injury or death. If there are few-enough parties that they are only ever caught in their own avalanches, one expects the avalancheinvolvement (and incident) rate per unit area per unit time, r single-party , to be proportional to the party density:
r single-party = r 0 n party (1) The implication is straightforward: More parties, proportionally more involvements. We estimate the many factors subsumed into r 0 (avalanches per party per unit time) in Appendix B.
What if there are enough parties that there is a chance one group could trigger a slide that hits another group?
There are two important factors:
1. When there are more parties in an area, they will trigger more avalanches (rate r 0 n party ), as before.
2. If the average avalanche that day sweeps through an area A avalanche , the number of other parties that will be struck by that avalanche is approximately 1 A avalanche n party .
So, the rate of inter-party avalanche involvements, r interparty , ought to scale like r interparty = r single-party A avalanche n party Thus, r interparty = r 0 A avalanche n 2 party .
The rate of inter-party involvements should scale like the party-density squared (n 2 ). This is the key observation. Why is n 2 party important? Let's look at the rate that parties will have an involvement of either kind by summing the rates:
That is:
or, suggestively,
An illustrative plot of these rates is shown in Figure 2 . If the party density, n party , is small, then n 2 party is smaller still, just as (0.1) 2 is 0.01. If n party is larger than 1, though, then n 2 party dominates the problem, just as 10 2 is 100. What, then, sets the scale of "1" ? Equation 3 holds the answer: Once A avalanche n party 1, inter-party involvements will dominate. This makes 1 We assume a uniform distribution of parties and that N parties is "large". The result for any N parties is derived in Appendix A. The correction to Equation 2 is (N parties −1)/N parties , never more-impactful than a factor of two. Figure 2 . Illustrative plots showing quadratic growth in inter-party involvements surpassing linear growth in singleparty involvements when npartyA avalanche exceeds 1; when there is more than one party per avalanche-area. The interparty critical density for an A avalanche = 0.2 km 2 avalanche, as in this example, is n critical = 5 parties/km 2 . The vertical scale will vary widely with snowpack properties (see Appendix B), but the relative rates between single-party and inter-party involvements depend only on A avalanche . The parameters chosen for these plots highlight the importance of both avalanche size and party density -when avalanches are large or parties are close together, inter-party involvement becomes likely.
sense -once there is roughly one party per avalanchearea, any triggered avalanche is likely to hit another party. This notion is intuitive -in-bounds avalanches at ski areas are scary in large part because the skierdensity is so high.
We define this critical density as n critical ≡ 1/A avalanche . It is of particular utility because it depends only on the expected size of a day's avalanches, and not on any other property of a day's anticipated instability, including the likelihood of triggering a slide.
While it is difficult to predict the absolute involvement rate, as the determination of r 0 is uncertain, one can consider the ratio of inter-party involvements to total involvements: As shown in Figure 3 , this has the expected behavior, where inter-party involvements become significant as n party A avalanche approaches 1.
B. Relationship of inter-party involvement rate to avalanche size
Equations 2 and 3 have an important corollary: If the size or likelihood of a day's avalanches is greater, we should expect the rate at which inter-party involvements occur to be greater. If slides are more likely, r 0 will tend to increase, and if slides are larger, A avalanche is larger. As backcountry travelers, larger and more-likely slides will force wary travelers to consider larger areas (further uphill) and more places (increased number of potential start zones) in the context of inter-party incidents. In our model, incidents with A avalanche n party 1 are likely to include inter-party involvements. Indeed, if A avalanche is large-enough, as in the 0.13 km 2 Jumbo Mountain slide [10] , backcountry travelers can even bury parties sitting at home on a sofa.
C. Relationship of inter-party involvement rate to terrain
Looking at the equations alone, one would expect both the incident rate and the inter-party involvement rate to be relatively low. Even in mountainous terrain, start-zones are comparatively small, and much of the area is not avalanche terrain.
Critically, however, backcountry travelers are often concentrated in both start zones and avalanche terrain by the desire for quality skiing and the travel-focusing effects of terrain itself. Furthermore, limited access points (mountain passes/trailheads) for those parties tend to further concentrate those parties into yet higher densities.
These concentrated party densities can be large. As an example, consider "The Slot", a popular backcountry ski route at Snoqualmie Pass, WA. In its narrow upper reaches, it is perhaps 30 m wide and 250 m long. If there are but two parties in the couloir, the effective party density is greater than 250 parties/km 2 . For scale, the population density of the nearby city of Seattle, Washington is ∼ 3400 people/km 2 [11] .
D. Weather and snow conditions as density and consequence amplifiers
Storm-skiing
It is a guess, but the Pacific-Northwestern interparty avalanche hazard may be at its greatest on deepsnow storm-skiing days, when trail-breaking is arduous, avalanches are likely, and powder fever is high. Arduous trail-breaking may be the most-powerful concentrator of backcountry travelers, amplifying the already-powerful magnetism of an extant skintrack.
On storm-skiing days, day-tripping backcountry travelers embark from a limited set of trailheads and head for a limited set of "safe" objectives. In Western Washington State, with a population of thousands of active backcountry travelers [12] , there are approximately nine such popular trailheads. As skintracks are forged moredeeply into the morning, they bifurcate, but the number of traditional and natural ski options remains slim.
Optimal conditions
"Good" conditions can concentrate parties. Mountains and routes offer only certain optimal times for passage. In the Cascades, and perhaps everywhere, this can be seen prominently in periods of spring/summer skiing; both snowpack and limited access curtail skiing at other times. There are narrow optimal windows for all of Tahoma/Rainier's Fuhrer Finger, the North Face of the Northwest Ridge of Pahto/Adams, and Ulrich's Couloir of Stuart -these are listed for their combination of popularity and constrained terrain, where a small summer slide can ravage anyone below. Indeed, on April 1, 2019, it was reported [13] that 16 people attempted, and bottlenecked, the ski route on the Grand Teton.
Wintertime weather windows provide perhaps even more temporal concentration, as the number of good days for attempting bold routes is slim, perhaps only one or two weekends per season. Fortunately, for now, the number of skiers attempting bold winter routes seems low-enough that inter-party hazard is likely to be a subdominant concern.
In addition to temporal concentration at the scale of days, safety and snow-quality considerations may also concentrate parties on shorter durations. Springtime daily melt-freeze/corn cycles can constrain safe travel to time intervals measured in hours. The arrival of a storm or imminent warming can force travelers to enter or cross slopes before hazard increases. Finally, the perceived pressure from other people, whether to make the first tracks on a slope or, again paradoxically, to cross/descend a slope before the presence of other parties can make the slope more hazardous, can concentrate parties in small areas.
Reduced visibility
If nearby parties cannot be seen, as in the Lizard Range incident (Section III A), and the distances between parties are greater than that allowed by voice contact, it is impossible to be aware of anyone above or below. In low-visibility conditions in densely-traveled areas, this may drive us to avoid descending or ascending an otherwise-reasonable route simply because it may not be possible to verify that the route is free of other travelers.
III. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS
Here, we enumerate a series of inter-party incidents, near-misses, and possible inter-party incidents. We provide a subjective summary from an inter-partyinvolvement perspective. The references offer expanded detail. Several of the incidents appear to have been reported only informally. It is a surprise that it has been difficult to find formal accident reports for some modern Canadian avalanches, each of which have required rescue or a coroner.
While the catalyst for this paper is the accident described in Section III H, these incidents are presented in chronological order. This enumeration is not intended to be comprehensive, but rather to provide both a sense of the varied types of inter-party involvements and to make clear that these involvements happen.
For incidents where documentation makes it possible, we have attempted to measure the areas in question, the number of parties, and compute both the party density and n party A avalanche , summarized in Table I . The areas were measured using Caltopo [14] and attempt to cover the terrain that would reasonably be regarded as "connected" by an observer on the ground; this is a somewhat-subjective quantity (see Appendix B 1). At Krause's suggestion [15] , we include the avalanche type, to the extent that it is reported in the record.
A. Lizard Range, February 13, 2001
A party of five skiers crossed over a ridgeline outside the Fernie Ski Area, intent on skiing a constrained 35-40-degree route. As they prepared for descent, a ski cut triggered a 24 m-wide and 28 cm-deep wind-slab avalanche [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] , sweeping down the route and out of sight. At approximately the same time, a party of thirteen foreign skiers was hit by a size-2.5 avalanche while traversing the side of the valley below. Six skiers were caught, resulting in two fatalities. A third party witnessed the entire incident and immediately returned toward the ski area to raise an alarm. On the way, they encountered the first party, which was unaware of the slide's impact on the second party.
B. Empress Lake, March 20, 2004 A party of snowmobilers [16, [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] assessed a cliffdrop in steep terrain, concluding that the expected instability was sufficiently manageable. The cliff-drop was attempted, triggering a small slab and apparently damaging a sled. As the party regrouped midpath and assessed the damage, a second party appeared. The second party climbed immediately into the now-overhead start-zone, triggering a D2.5 slide (30 m×125-150 m×150 cm crown). Three were caught, one was killed.
C. Nisqually/Wilson Glaciers, June 14, 2008
On a weekend that surprised skiers on at least three Cascadian volcanoes [26] [27] [28] [29] with large summer slab avalanches, a party of skiers descending the slopes of Tahoma/Mount Rainier triggered a slab [30] that caught an ascending solo splitboarder and nearly caught an ascending climbing party at the convergence of the Wilson and Nisqually glaciers. The splitboarder and triggering skier were carried and sustained only minor injury. A second trip-report [31] from Rainier's south side emphasizes the day's instability during what is generally prime volcano-ski season. D. Boulder/Turbo Mountain, March 13, 2010 Perhaps the most-spectacular inter-party accident [32] [33] [34] of which the author is aware: A snowmobiling festival/competition, with snowmobiles highmarking above ∼ 200 spectators at the time of the slide, was directly struck by a D3 slide presumed to have been triggered by a participant. Approximately forty people were buried, with 32 injured and two fatalities. The on-scene coordination and rapid rescue response were remarkably effective for such a chaotic event.
After-action review [35] notes the probability of legal charges in similar future events.
E. Eagle Pass Avalanche, March 19, 2010 Only an Incident Summary [36] , an Avalanche Involvement Report [37] , and an associated photograph appear to be available for this accident; this synopsis is composed from news articles and indirect references in the Boulder Mountain accident reporting. One week following the Boulder Mountain slide, a snowmobiling party of two may have triggered a D3.5 slide above one or two parties of at least ten snowmobilers, yielding one fatality and at least one injury [32, 38, 39] . The total number of people involved may have been as large as 21 [35] .
F. Little Cottonwood "Frenzy", November 13, 2011 In November of 2011, the year's first skiable snow arrived atop faceted autumn snow, drawing many backcountry skiers into the un-opened Little Cottonwood Canyon ski resorts.
At least 11 human-triggered avalanches were reported, yielding one fatality and one broken femur. Perhaps most-striking in the fatality's accident report [40] :
It was reported that other parties at Alta continued to ski and knock down avalanches into Greeley Bowl while the rescue was in progress. Creating another incident during this situation is unacceptable.
G. Taylor Mountain Near-Miss, January 24, 2012
A skier ski-cutting a popular run on a reportedlyunstable day triggered a D3.5, R4 avalanche [41] that crossed the uptrack for nearby slopes and ascended an adjoining slope. The uptrack was buried under up to twenty feet of debris. Fortunately, nobody was caught, though a small shift in timing would have yielded an inter-party accident. The outcry and subsequent discussion [42] [43] [44] was intense and sustained.
H. Kendall Peak, December 19, 2015 This accident is the catalyst for this work. As detailed by the NWAC accident report [1] , a solo skier disappeared after early afternoon on December 19, the first deep storm-skiing Saturday of the 2015/2016 season at Snoqualmie Pass [45] . The number of skiers and parties in the area was unusually high, with at least nine parties recreating in a single square kilometer. In Table I , the estimations of A and N are correlated, hence the diminished range of n party .
After an extensive search effort, exceeding 3000 person-hours, the solo-skier's remains were recovered on June 4, 2016. The accident location, and the injuries to the skier, were consistent with an avalanche-related fatality. Subsequent investigation revealed that two parties had triggered avalanches uphill of the accident site on the afternoon of the skier's disappearance. Furthermore, the first of those avalanches can be regarded as an inter-party near miss, as a minute's difference in timing would have seen the second party struck by the first. NWAC's analysis of the accident does not take a position on whether the fatality was caused by an interparty avalanche -both a third avalanche triggered by the soloist or a natural avalanche remain viable hypotheses.
I. Rogers Pass, Avalanche Crest, February 14, 2016 A party of two led the way into an alpine zone in an attempt to get ahead of the Rogers Pass crowds [46, 47] . After a short lap, they encountered four other parties (from four nationalities!) on their way up Avalanche Crest proper. Two of the foreign parties trailed them as they pushed higher. The party of two reached their highpoint and skied. Before they were clear of the line, one of the parties above began to ski, triggering a D2.5-3 avalanche [48] . Both of the skiers below were caught and carried, one sustaining life-threatening injury.
J. Grandfather Couloir, April 3, 2016 As detailed by the CAIC accident report [49] and subsequent lawsuit [50, 51] , two parties of two met above a consequential couloir with a mandatory mid-route rappel. The couloir is adjoined by Oblivion Bowl, which also funnels through the mid-route choke. Recognizing the inter-party hazard, the two parties agreed to let Group 1 ski and rappel first, while Group 2 waited above for a cell-phone call. (Group 1 had radios, and the region, Bear Creek, has a pioneering community radio protocol, see Section IV E, but Group 2 did not.) Group 1 skied the couloir without incident but, while mid-rappel, was struck by a slide from above, sustaining injury. Group 2 had waited roughly 45 minutes and attempted to call Group 1 once. Warming snow and the imminent arrival of at least one more Group had spurred Group 2 into skiing before receiving a call from Group 1. Group 2 triggered an R1D1 sluff -the same slide that struck Group 1.
The judgment from the San Miguel County Court is notable for its detailed analysis of the accident, its humanity, and reasoned approach to assigning fault. Pursuant to important details in the case, Group 2 was found to be financially liable for the injuries sustained by Group 1.
K. Mt. Herman, March 4, 2017 As reported in NWAC's accident summaries [52] :
Widespread 1-2 ft storm slabs and larger 3-5 ft wind slabs were reported in the backcountry near Mt Baker on Saturday, March 4th. An incident occurred on Mt Herman when a large wind slab on an east aspect was triggered from a party above, partially burying two and completely burying one in a separate party at the base of the slide path. The impacted party was transitioning back to climbing skins when they were caught in the avalanche.
L. Hawkins Mountain, March 4, 2017 As detailed by the NWAC accident report [53] , a party of two snowmobilers triggered a large slide (D2+). At the time of the slide, a separate party of two snowmobilers was eating lunch in the runout zone, with their machines turned off. The lower party ran from the slide -their sleds and rescue gear were buried. The lower party was able to rescue one of the triggering snowmobilers and locate/extract the body of the second [54] .
M. Bear Creek, Temptation slide path, February 19, 2019
A group of three snowboarders left the Telluride ski area to ski a permanently-closed but frequentlyskied [55] route. Partway through the descent, a boarder triggered a slide that stepped down, D2 in size, running 2,000 vertical feet [56] . The slide buried six feet deep a solo skier out for a short exercise jaunt on a heavily-used trail.
Seeing many tracks entering and leaving the deposition zone, the uphill party beacon-searched and spotprobed the debris pile without result before returning to town. The solo skier, reported missing by his wife, was located by probe-line the following day.
N. Common threads
While this enumeration is not intended to be comprehensive, it is interesting to look for commonalities among the incidents. Two stand out: 1) For those incidents where n party A avalanche can be estimated, 6 out of 9 overlapped n party A avalanche ∼ 0.1. This is smaller than the most-natural expectation of Equation 4, but it is encouraging to find a possible invariant. The model is, of course, blind to any propensity for parties to avoid one-another. 2) Eleven out of twelve incidents involved slab avalanches. Whether this is simple correlation with size/frequency or more meaningful must await further study. The Grandfather Couloir incident shows that loose slides can cause inter-party incidents as well 2 .
IV. MITIGATION
It is unlikely, and perhaps undesirable, that the number of backcountry travelers will be reduced. Therefore, we must find ways to limit the likelihood of inter-party incidents. The following are strategies that may mitigate the risk. There are certainly more -these are suggested to organize and catalyze discussion.
A. Awareness and Education
Awareness of the increasing likelihood of inter-party conflict with density may, on its own, help to curtail inter-party involvements. That is, of course, the intent of this work. In places where the density of travelers approaches the critical density, the hazard should be discussed and mitigated. At least a passing mention of inter-party hazard in avalanche education at all levels now seems prudent.
As better understanding of the factors that lead to inter-party avalanche involvements becomes understood, it will make sense to bring light to the hazard in avalanche bulletins. A key takeaway for forecasters is the apparent importance of avalanche size in determining the likelihood of inter-party involvements, especially in situations (e.g. persistent weaknesses) where avalanche size alone may not convince travelers to stay home.
B. Density reduction
The root of inter-party incidents is not the number of backcountry travelers, but their density. Backcountry travelers use a tiny fraction of North American alpine terrain, perhaps primarily due to access constraints. Following the Kendall Peak accident [1] , the author has sharply curtailed trips into densely-skied terrain, choosing lesser-known destinations, difficult access, or lowerquality snow in order to decrease overhead risk from other parties. While this strategy has limits, there are still lonely places with great skiing to be found on the map. As advocacy organizations work to expand wintertime access, it may be reasonable to add safety to the reasons for improved access. Inferring from our estimates, it is natural to encourage party densities below one per characteristic-avalanche-size. D2 slides are roughly 0.01 km 2 in area. D3 slides are roughly 0.1 km 2 in area [57] . Hence, encouraging party densities below 10-100 parties/km 2 in localized avalanche terrain would be wise, and ten-times lower (intimated by Figure 3 ) may be prudent.
C. Travel practices
If density cannot be wholly avoided, then we must find ways to limit our susceptibility to other parties and the risks we may pose to others. We cannot control others' choices, but we can control our own.
Defensive routefinding
Like defensive driving, defensive routefinding consists of making choices that mitigate the risks that others may pose. Careful selection of routes through terrain, and, to a lesser extent, times to pass through terrain, can strongly limit the chance that another party's avalanche might hit us.
Examples:
• Many ridgelines are not susceptible to slides from above -traveling upon such a ridgeline provides substantial protection from inter-party hazard.
• Some routes pass through areas of unavoidable avalanche hazard -there are plenty of examples:
The Mousetrap [58] at Rogers Pass, Source Lake Basin and Mushroom Couloir at Snoqualmie Pass. Avoiding those areas during times that humantriggered slides are likely, rather than only when natural slides are likely, will limit the risk of an inter-party incident.
• The Hawkins Mountain (Section III L) and Turbo Hillclimb (Section III D) accidents make clear the danger of extended loitering in inter-partyavalanche terrain. When assessing safe spots, the likelihood of human triggers above must be considered.
• Avalanches only happen in avalanche terrainavoiding avalanche terrain is a sure-fire way to avoid avalanche incidents of all kinds, including inter-party incidents.
Choosing not to travel (down or up) routes at times that we expect others might be ascending or descending is also a form of defensive routefinding. Anticipating the choices of others and making our own conservative diversion or delay in order to limit the risks we might present to others is a mark of a conscientious traveler.
Active measures
When we travel in start zones, we are potential triggers for avalanches. In addition to passive measures to ensure that we are not traveling above other people, there are small measures we can take to communicate with those who might be below. Radios (see Section IV E) are the superior method of communication in the backcountry, but are not used by everyone, nor are they completely reliable. As a simple measure, rock climbers and mountaineers yell "Rope!" before tossing down a rappel rope, "On Rappel!" before rappelling (which can dislodge rock), "Off Rappel" to communicate to those above and below, and "Rope" again, when the rope is pulled (which can generate more rockfall). The wording is important, but in the snow world, something akin to "Hello Below!", "Skiing!", and "Clear!" could provide warning and an opportunity for communication with those below. Similarly, for a group entering constrained terrain from below, it might be appropriate to shout (or radio (see IV E)), "Entering Couloir!" and make an occasional shout as they ascend.
Verbal warnings are, of course, antithetical to a lowimpact and quiet winter day (and may lead to confusion, as shouts are a sign of an emergency). If the rate of inter-party incidents continues to grow, the necessity of such measures, and the approximate skier density at which they are appropriate, will become self-evident. At a crowded crag, it is perhaps more welcome than it is jarring to hear a climber yell, "Rope!" as they begin an orderly descent.
In addition to verbal warnings, making micro-route decisions during ascent and descent to maximize the leader's ability to see up/down-slope can increase the likelihood of noting a potential inter-party conflict before it becomes reality.
D. Regional travel standards for routes
Just as we all agree to drive on one side of a road in order to prevent head-on automotive collisions, community standards can improve mutually-beneficial cooperation between parties who have never met.
Run lists
In recent years [59, 60] , the notion of a "Run List" has moved from professional operations discussions into the mainstream. A "run list" is a shared enumeration/mapping of regions and ski runs used to facilitate discussion and improve adherence to each day's terrain assessment/plan. In courses at the Washington Alpine Club, run lists have become an integral part of our courses, and our students often refer to them after the course is complete. A publicly-shared run list can serve as a basis for conditions reporting, incident response, and general communication. While run lists themselves will not offer any advantage for inter-party incidents -they may even serve to concentrate travelers during times of higher hazard -a strong basis for communication is bedrock upon which many mitigation strategies can be built.
Terrain-specific traditions
In certain high-density traffic locations, it may be helpful to establish certain local traffic patterns. The aviation industry has "Approach Procedures" and "Instrument Approach Procedures" (IAP) [61] for most airports that describe the airport-specific information needed to land and take off safely. While IAPs contain a level of detail not needed for backcountry travel, the occasional publicized traffic pattern may be of use. These may be best described by examples:
Near the Mount Baker Ski Area, there is a backcountry ski run known as "Blueberry Chutes". It is a hightraffic run in avalanche terrain, 1.5 km from a parking lot, with a straightforward and comparatively safe alternative ascent route that reaches the run at the top. It is also possible to ascend the run directly, which is arduous, slow, exposed to avalanche hazard, and exposed to skiers dropping in from above. In addition, those ascending from the bottom sometimes choose to transition to downhill skiing mid-slope, spending even longer in a hazardous spot. This location has become the site of inter-party conflicts [62] [63] [64] and can deliver plenty of consequence [65, 66] . Such a location is a prime opportunity for a simple local understanding -downhill traffic only in Blueberry Chutes -to be more-formally known. While this strategy would have an impact on weaker skiers incapable of skiing the steepest top pitch, it also protects those weaker skiers from getting clobbered from above.
The Slot, a couloir on Snoqualmie Mountain near Snoqualmie Pass, WA, was once regarded as much as a climbing route [67] as a ski line. In 2004, it was sufficiently rarely skied that it still made occasional sense [68] to ascend directly up the route for convenience. The Slot is now routinely skied, even by those who ski before their day-jobs in Seattle. It is a rare thing to be the first to the Slot's entrance after a storm, and it is common to encounter multiple parties at the entrance. In the present environment, it is hard to imagine a good reason to ascend the Slot in winter. The hazard from above is significant.
The Alpental Ski Area sits in a constrained valley, with densely-used ski-touring terrain at, and beyond, its head. The area has a relatively-unique policy of limited avalanche control within its "Back Bowls" backcountry terrain. The slide paths and runouts from that terrain reach the valley bottom. Passing beneath the area during times of control work, or traveling beneath the liftaccessible backcountry during times of instability is inadvisable. Furthermore, the skiers returning to the ski area are often traveling fast on the most-tempting skintrack. Recent efforts [69] have helped to separate uphill and downhill traffic, and move uphill traffic to safer locations. The US Ski Mountaineering Association maintains an updated list [70] of uphill travel and boundary policies for ski areas -it could make sense to broaden it, or a similar repository, to include travel traditions for high-traffic backcountry terrain.
"Run board"
One of the principal difficulties in avoiding conflict between disparate groups is the simple awareness of the existence and location of other parties. If parties leaving a trailhead were to note their number, intended destination, and approximate schedule, perhaps akin to filing a flight plan, subsequent parties would have the opportunity to know who might be ahead, and where. Furthermore, if a radio channel were appended, communication with those ahead might be possible.
The potential problems with such a system are myriad, but it may offer utility to the conscientious.
A run board may be more useful in constrained terrain, like The Slot at Snoqualmie Pass, where entering parties might note their number and the time at which they entered, as a note for those who follow behind. The 370 m-tall couloir has a visibility-obscuring dogleg about a third of the way down. Without coordination between parties in the couloir, it is possible for a group descending the couloir to be impacted by the actions of a group they have never seen. A conscientious party arriving at the Slot's entrance could, seeing that a party had entered the couloir only minutes before, choose to wait a few minutes for those below to clear the run. The social-network share-ability of a photo of a run board atop a popular run (#firsttracks ?) might increase the likelihood of its use. A "run-clock", fashioned after the out-of-office "back at 3pm" clock-signs, altered to "dropped in at 7:45 am" may suffice.
E. Radios
Radios have emerged as an increasingly common tool in the backcountry -remarkable for a sport which eschews complication and weight. In the author's North American experience, FRS/GMRS radios are a de-facto standard, the range limitations of the FRS/GMRS standards are eclipsed by the unlicensed nature of the spectrum 3 . In 2018, these radios have as many as 14 possible <1 km-range (FRS) [71] channels and partiallyoverlapping 14 3-10 km-range (GMRS) [72] [73] [74] channels.
In addition to the utility radios have for communication within a party [75] , radios have the potential to improve situational awareness and coordination between parties.
Community channel/party channel
Some regions, Telluride's Bear Creek in particular, have begun to define community radio channels [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] . Both a glance at a map of Bear Creek and the inclusion of two Bear Creek accidents in this paper suggest that, for Bear Creek locals, inter-party coordination is essential. While the majority of the documentation praising the effort has, perhaps necessarily, been from the radio manufacturer, community radio channels appear to have made a positive difference in promoting coordination between parties and speeding rescue efforts. Indeed, the court decision [50] regarding the Grandfather Couloir accident specifically states that radios are "commonly used to facilitate communication between groups in similar scenarios."
As party density increases, it may be necessary for backcountry-specific radio manufacturers to add the ability to monitor a community channel and an intraparty channel simultaneously, so that intra-party communication need not obstruct inter-party communication. Such a system could be confusing in the haste of an incident -good radio discipline on a party channel is preferable, so long as it remains practical. Steen and Edgerly[76] make a similar suggestion of a the addition of a "scan" functionality to future radios. Aviation radios [81, 82] have two-channel "Active"-channel and "Standby"-channel functionality, enabling listening to both and transmitting on one or the other easily.
FRS/GMRS radios, in general, offer the user the reverse feature. Digital "privacy codes" can be used define a sub-channel by selective muting within each channel. Operating the radio tuned to a channel, but without a "privacy code", may allow a listener to hear all of the traffic on a particular channel. An example: A radio tuned to "4-20" will make audible only those transmissions sent from other "4-20" radios. A radio tuned to "4" alone will hear transmissions from "4, 4-1, 4-2, ..., 4-20, ... ". If radio traffic is not copious, such a setting could provide the wary traveler with slightly more information about other parties.
V. EXTENSIONS
The model presented in Section II is general, and should extend to the estimation of rates for other interparty backcountry interactions. Krause [15] points out that inter-party rescues may be of similar interest. Inter-party rescues and inter-party observations are interesting both for understanding the rate at which interparty rescues occur and as a proxy for inter-party involvement rates. As the area, A observation , over which one party can see or hear an avalanche triggered by another party is much larger than A avalanche , we should expect the rate at which parties observe avalanches triggered by others to be much higher than the rate of inter-party involvements. If A observation is substituted for A avalanche , the mathematics should be the same. The model then predicts that the rate of interparty avalanche observations/rescues should be roughly r inter-party observation ≈ r 0 A observation n 2 party . As avalanche observations and rescues happen far more often than fatal accidents, there may be an opportunity for new research with more-reliable statistics.
VI. CONCLUSION
We made a first-principles estimation of the scaling of inter-party avalanche involvements with party-density and found it to be quadratic. Furthermore, we find that inter-party involvements should become a significant fraction of all avalanche involvements when the localized party density approaches one party per avalanche area. This result is independent of the day's likelihood of triggering avalanches, and may have utility for avalanche forecasters.
We explored a series of North-American avalanche incidents in order to show varied ways in which interparty involvements have occurred. Moreover, the partydensities at which these incidents occurred are roughly consistent with the model, with many incidents near n party A avalanche ∼ 0.1.
We enumerated and discussed a number of possible strategies for mitigating inter-party avalanche hazards. Improved awareness, spreading our parties out over greater area, traveling with others in mind, implementing regional travel standards, and communicating more-effectively may all help to limit the number of involvements.
As this work was first drafted in an Autumn-2018 Seattle coffee shop, customers discussed how their friends encountered "lines of cars" at a local hiking trailhead. This aligns with our experience in recent years, with unprecedented numbers of wilderness travelers at every trailhead and the disappearance of lonely places in the Cascades. Inter-party avalanche involvements are coming, if they have not already arrived. It behooves us, individually and as a community, to develop strategies to proactively address this emerging hazard.
The source code and data needed to generate this document are freely-available [83] .
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Appendix A: Correctly handling N parties Here, we estimate, without approximation with regard to N parties , the quantities derived in Section II.
We begin with the same initial assumption:
r single-party = r 0 N parties A But now, we include the fact that if there are N parties parties exploring the area A, only N parties − 1 parties can be caught in an inter-party avalanche.
r interparty = r single-party (N parties − 1)
A avalanche A which simplifies to r interparty = r 0 n 2 party A avalanche N parties − 1 N parties .
Here, we see that the correction we will need is, in general, a factor of (N parties − 1)/N parties , which is bounded above by 1 and below by 1/2.
The definition of the total rate remains unchanged r = r single-party + r interparty and Equation 4 is modified to r inter-party r = 1 1 npartyA avalanche N parties −1 N parties + 1 .
It is then clear that the true figure of merit is n party A avalanche N parties − 1 N parties and the critical density is
This passes the sanity check, as when N parties = 2, n critical is two parties per avalanche area -all the parties in the area have to be in the same avalanche incident in order for an inter-party involvement to occur. When N parties is large, no such coincidence is required.
Sensitivity to area estimation
These estimations are sensitive to the determination of A, which is subjective. If our parties and start-zones are uniformly distributed (an underlying assumption of the model), these rates are insensitive to A. If our parties tend to congregate near start-zones within A, but the connected terrain is larger, A's determination becomes challenging.
The crossover, n critical , from single-party involvements to inter-party involvements is least-sensitive: n party A avalanche = N parties A avalanche A Absolute-rate estimations are more sensitive, as r single-party = N parties N start-zones A 2 w party s party f trigger A start-zone For these reasons, it will be difficult for quantitative estimates of these rates and critical densities to be more accurate than a factor of two in many cases.
